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1 Introduction
This paper considers the profitability of foreign direct investment (FDI) in
economies with labour unions and self-interested governments. Because FDI
involves sunk costs, an foreign investor’s risk consist of changes in wages,
taxes, regulations and market conditions that implicitly expropriate invest-
ment rents after FDI has taken place. We assume that labour market insti-
tutions are so stable that foreign direct investors take them as given. Hence,
we can compare FDI in three different environments: (a) a competitive (or
full deregulated) labour market, (b) “efficient bargaining”, in which unions
and employers negotiate over both wages and employment, and (c) “right-
to-manage bargaining”, in which these negotiate only over wages.
A multinational company (MNC) can hide its profits e.g. through transfer
pricing, but at some cost. This prevents governments from taxing investment
rents entirely. Hence, the “creeping expropriation” of FDI more likely takes
takes place through the combined use of taxation and labour market regula-
tion. The MNC decides how efficiently it uses its resources. Ownership rights
may be severely restricted by all kinds of regulation or direct government in-
tervention, but as long as the owner has not been formally expropriated, he
can always decide to leave his assets unproductive and to exclude the other
from using them.1 To explain the strategic dependence between unions,
governments and prospective investors, we use a common agency model2 to
establish a political equilibrium in which the government determines taxes
and labour market regulation, and lobbies representing unions and MNCs
make offers that relate prospective contributions to government policy.
In the studies that examine the strategic interaction between MNCs and
local governments, no foreign investment typically occurs unless taxation is
restricted so that MNCs can end up with a positive profit. In Choi and Es-
fahani (1998), the government’s ability to tax FDI is limited by an MNCs
ability to withhold an important production asset, which causes the spe-
cific capital of the host economy to become idle. In Schnitzer (1999), the
MNC facing the risk of expropriation can use its control rights to protect its
1Cf. Schnitzer (1999).
2Cf. Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994), and Dixit, Gross-
man and Helpman (1997).
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investment. Our study differs from these papers in the following respects:
• Esfahani and Schnitzer consider only entirely benevolent governments,
which have no interests of their own, but we assume a self-interested
government, which receives contributions from interest groups (e.g.,
MNCs and labour unions) in return for modifications in its policy.
• We demonstrate that the political process prevents the expropriation
of profits, even without institutional restrictions on taxation.
In line with Schnitzer (1999), we however restrict attention to the cases where
the following conditions hold:
(i) The host country has no funds or knowledge to carry out the investment
project by itself. Hence, a MNC is needed for this purpose.
(ii) The government cannot make commitments to its future policy.
(iii) Implicit agreements can protect the economic interests of a foreign in-
vestor without explicit guarantees.
The government can weaken or strengthen the union’s possibilities to
respond to the employers’ offers e.g. by compulsory arbitration. The micro-
foundations of collective bargaining3 tell that when two players are making
alternating offers to each other, they behave so as to maximize a weighed
geometric average of their utilities – the Generalized Nash product. The
weights of such an average, which reflect the relative bargaining power of
the parties, are determined by the parameters of the model. Labour mar-
ket regulation influences union power through these parameters. Following
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we assume that the government can make
smooth and continuous changes in union power. The results can then be
generalized for discrete changes in union power.
The following papers examine the relationship between labour unions and
MNCs with inward FDI. Naylor and Santoni (1999) suggest that because
high wages reduce potential rents associated with investment, a decrease in
relative union bargaining power in a potential host economy subsequently
increases the likelihood of FDI within that economy. Zhao (1998) shows
3Cf. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
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that because FDI increases MNCs’ mobility between economies, it improves
MNC’s position in collective bargaining and depresses union wages in every
economy. These papers assume that relative union bargaining power is ex-
ogenously given, and that there is bargaining over wages only. We assume
that relative union bargaining power is endogenous in the political equilib-
rium. Following Manning (1987a; 1987b), we consider also the case where a
MNC and a labour union can bargain over both wages and employment.
Haaparanta (1996) examines inward FDI in a common agency framework.
Because he focuses on a case in which a number of benevolent governments try
to attract an MNC to make FDI, he assumes the governments as principals,
and the MNC he designates as the agent. In this paper, we consider the case
where an MNC’s willingness to invest in a country depends on both labour
market institutions and the response of a self-interested government. Hence,
in our model, the MNC and the union representing its workers are principals
while the government is the agent.
Palokangas (2003a) examines the political economy of collective bargain-
ing in the following framework. The economy is closed and output is pro-
duced from labour only. First, there is a bargain over wages, then a bargain
over employment between the producer and the labour union. Depending on
government regulations, union power may be different within these two bar-
gains. Workers and producers lobby the government. In this framework, it is
shown that if it is much easier to tax wages than profits, then the government
protects union power by labour market regulation. In this study, we extend
the model of Palokangas (2003a) for an open economy with capital and a for-
eign direct investor. Combining this extension with Schnitzer’s (1999) ideas
of expropriation, we obtain a framework in which the profitability of FDI can
be examined in the presence of different labour market institutions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure
of the model as an extensive game. Section 3 considers collective bargaining.
The government’s behaviour is endogenized in section 4 and the political
equilibrium is constructed in sections 5 and 6. Section 7 examines the im-
plicit agreement between the MNC and the government when the former can
control the use of its resources.
3
2 The agents in an extensive game
We assume that a MNC which is able to invest in an open economy in order
to produce goods from labour and capital. The MNC sees the economy only
as an export base and is therefore not interested in the local market it offers.
Capital cost is sunk for the MNC. Once investment has been made, it cannot
be dissolved and resold as old investment goods.4
The MNC produces output y from labour l and capital k through the
thrice differentiable and strictly concave function f as follows:
y = af(l, k), fi > 0, fii < 0, f(0, k) = y(l, 0) = 0, 0 < a ≤ a ≤ a, (1)
where a and a are constants and subscripts i ∈ {l, k} denote the partial
derivatives with respect to i ∈ {l, k}. The MNC can use its control rights
to determine total factor productivity a. It produces normally with the
maximum effort a = a, but in the case of expropriation it has the option
of ‘slowing down’ production with a = a. The domestic firms in the host
economy cannot replace the MNC by making the same investment.
The MNC is able to hide its profits pi from taxation at some cost, e.g.
through transfer pricing.5 Let qpi be hidden and (1 − q)pi observed profit,
where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. We assume that the level of profits does not affect the
MNC’s ability to conceal profits, but that such activity is subject to increas-
ing costs. The real cost of hiding profits, Z, is then linear homogeneous with
respect to total profits pi but increasing and strictly convex with respect to
the ratio q of hidden to total profits. With all profits revealed, q = 0, there
is no such cost, Z = 0. Hence, the following cost function can be established:
Z = z(q)ck, z′ > 0, z′′ > 0, z(0) = 0, z .= Z/(ck), (2)
where z is the ratio of administrative cost investment. Let θ be the profit
tax rate. After-tax profits are then equal to observed profits net of taxes,
θ(1− q)pi, hidden profits qpi minus costs of hiding profits, Z,
θ(1− q)pi + θ(1− q)pi − Z = [1− θ + θq − z(q)]pi.
4Grout (1984) and Palokangas (2000), Chapter 5, assume that capital can be sold as
old investment goods after machines have been installed. Because this extension would
complicate the model, we prefer to assume that capital is wholly country-specific.
5This assumption is from Palokangas (2000), p. 34-37. It is needed to eliminate fully
expropriating capital taxation.
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Since the MNC chooses q to maximize these, we obtain after-tax profits as
ϕ(θ)pi, ϕ(θ)
.
= cmax
q
[1− θ + θq − z(q)], ϕ′ < 0. (3)
The MNC and the labour union representing its workers bargain first over
wages and then over employment. We assume that the union and the MNC
bargain over the wage and employment after the MNC has made its invest-
ment.6 The government sets taxes, provides public services and regulates
the labour market. Any public policy measures that strengthen (weaken)
the position of unions in collective bargaining are called labour market reg-
ulation (deregulation). Unions and MNCs lobby the government, and offer
contributions that are conditional on prospective public policy. On the as-
sumption that the marginal disutility of employment is constant b in terms
of consumption, we can focus on an economy in which there is only one MNC
and one worker. These two agents bargain over labour conditions and lobby
the government. The government is free to set any tax t ∈ (−∞, 1) on wages.
We present the institutional characteristics of the economy as an extended
game with the following sequence of events. First, the nature chooses one of
the following labour market institutions: (a) a competitive labour market,
(b) bargaining over wages and employment, or (c) bargaining over wages
only. Second, the government and the MNC make an implicit agreement
on non-expropriating taxation. Third, the worker and the MNC lobby the
government (or the political elite) by announcing contributions. Fourth, the
government sets taxes, supplies public services, regulates relative union power
in the bargains over the wage and employment, and collects the contributions.
Fifth, the MNC decides on its investment. Sixth, the MNC and a labour
union representing the worker bargain over the wage. Seventh, the MNC
and the union bargain over employment. This extensive game is now solved
through backward induction: stages V II, V I and V in section 3, stages IV
and III in sections 4-6, and stages II and I in section 7.
6In a larger version of the model [Palokangas (2003b)], we examine the case where the
union and the MNC bargain over the wage and employment before the MNC has made
its investment. The results are qualitatively the same as in this paper, except that this
additional investment uncertainty is equivalent to an increase in the tax on capital.
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3 Collective bargaining
Noting the production function (1), we obtain the MNC’s total profit as
pi =
{
Π(a, l, k, w)
.
= y − wl − ck = af(l, k)− wl − ck with production,
Π
.
= Π(a, 0, k, w) = −ck without production,
(4)
where y output, l employment, w the wage, k capital and c the unit cost of
capital, which is given from abroad. The workers in the MNC’s service earn
v = V
.
= (1− t)wl − bl = [(1− t)w − b]l, (5)
where wl is wages, t the labour tax and b the marginal disutility of employ-
ment. During a strike, the MNC’s earns Π, while the union’s members earn
zero. Hence, the union maximizes its utility V , while the MNC maximizes
its profit Π minus its status quo income Π.
In the seventh stage of the extended game, there is asymmetric Nash
bargaining over employment l. Given (4) and (5), l is then determined by
max
l
V β[Π(a, l, k, w)− Π]1−β = max
l
{
β log V + (1− β) log[Π(a, l, k, w)− Π]}
= max
l
{
β log l + (1− β) log[y(a, l, k)− wl]},
where the parameter β ∈ [0, 1] is the measure of union relative power in
the bargaining over employment. Given this, the wage w is equal to the
weighted sum of the average product af(l, k)/l and the marginal product
afl(l, k) of labour, where the weights are the worker’s and the employer’s
relative bargaining power:
w = a[βf(l, k)/l + (1− β)fl(l, k)]. (6)
Inserting this into (4) and (5) yields the worker’s income and profit as follows:
v = V (a, l, k, t, β) = (1− t)a[βf(l, k) + (1− β)lfl(l, k)]− bl,
pi = Π̂ = y − wl − ck = (1− β)a[f(l, k)− lfl(l, k)]− ck,
∂V /∂l = (1− t)a[fl + (1− β)lfll]− b, ∂Π̂/∂l = (β − 1)lafll > 0. (7)
At the sixth stage of the extended game, there is asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining over the wage w. The wage w is then determined by the maximization
6
of the product V α
[
Π̂ − Π]1−α by w, where the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is the
measure of union relative power in the bargaining over the wage, given the
response at the second stage (6). Because there exists a one-to-one corre-
spondence from w to l through (6), then, given (4), (5) and (7), one can
equivalently maximize the logarithm
Λ(a, l, k, α, β, t)
.
= log
{
V α
[
Π̂− Π]1−α}
= α log V (a, l, k, t, β) + (1− α){log[f(l, k)− lfl(l, k)]+ log[(1− β)a]}
by employment l. This yields the first-order and second-order conditions:
∂Λ
∂l
(a, l, k, α, β, t) =
α
V
∂V
∂l
(a, l, k, t, β) +
(α− 1)lfll(l, k)
f(l, k)− lfl(l, k) = 0,
∂2Λ
∂l2
< 0.
(8)
At the fifth stage of the extended game, the MNC maximizes its profit
pi = Π̂(a, l, k, t, β) by investment k and employment l, given the equation (8).
Given (5) and (7), this maximization yields
pi(a, t, α, β) = max
l, k
{
Π̂
∣∣ ∂Λ/∂l = 0}, pi∣∣
β=1
= −ck < 0, l(a, t, α, β),
k(a, t, α, β), v(a, t, α, β), v
∣∣
α=β=0
= 0, w
∣∣
α=β=0
= b/(1− t),
pi
∣∣
α=β=0
= max
l, k
[af(l, k)− bl/(1− t)− ck], (∂pi/∂t)
α=β=0
< 0. (9)
4 Public policy
We characterize labour market institutions by the set Υ. The nature specifies
Υ in some of the following three forms:
(a) a fully competitive labour market, α = β = 0;
(b) bargaining over both wages and employment, α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1];
(c) bargaining over wages only, α ∈ [0, 1] and β = 0.
At the fourth stage of the extended game, the government takes Υ as given,
chooses (α, β) ∈ Υ by labour market regulation, sets the taxes (t, θ) on wages
wl and observed profits (1− q)pi, respectively, and produces a quantity g of
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public services from traded goods. Noting this, (6) and (9), we obtain the
government’s budget constraint as follows:
g(a, t, α, β, θ)
.
= twl + θ(1− q)pi. (10)
We assume that the economy is on the increasing part of the Laffer curve:
∂g/∂θ > 0, ∂g/∂t > 0. (11)
We denote the worker’s and the MNC’s contributions by Rw and Rf
respectively. Subtracting Rw from the worker’s total income v yields labour
income Cw. Subtracting Rf from the MNC’s after-tax profit (3) yields the
MNC’s net profit Cf . We specify differentiable functions
Cw(a, t, α, β, Rw)
.
= v(a, t, α, β)−Rw, ∂Cw/∂Rw = −1,
Cf (a, t, α, β, θ, Rf )
.
= ϕ(θ)pi(a, t, α, β)−Rf , ∂Cf/∂Rf = −1. (12)
The worker’s utility function is then given by
Uw(Cw) + U g(g), (Uw)′ > 0, (Uw)′′ < 0, (U g)′ > 0, (U g)′′ < 0. (13)
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), and noting (10)-(13), we obtain
the government’s objective function as:
G(a, t, α, β, θ, Rw, Rf ) = Rw +Rf + Uw(Cw) + U g(g). (14)
At the third stage of the extended game, the MNC and the worker (or the
labour union representing it) lobby the government for taxation and labour
market regulation (i.e., on variables θ, t, α and β). The contribution sched-
ules of the worker and the MNC are given by
Rw(a, θ, t, α, β), Rf (a, θ, t, α, β). (15)
Let ν be the lower limit of the MNC’s net income Cf according to an implicit
agreement between the government and the MNC. The government receives
contributions from the worker only if Cw is non-negative. Otherwise, the
worker refuses to work for the MNC, l = y = 0. Hence, the government
chooses its policy parameters from the set
Γ
.
=
{
(θ, t, α, β)
∣∣ (α, β) ∈ Υ, Cf(a, θ, t, α, β, Rc(a, θ, t, α, β)) ≥ 0,
Cw
(
a, θ, t, α, β,Rw(a, θ, t, α, β)
) ≥ 0, Cf ≥ ν}. (16)
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The government maximizes its welfare (14) by choosing (t, α, β, θ) ∈ Γ.
Following proposition 1 of Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is a set of contribution schedules
Rw∗(a, θ, t, α, β) and Rf∗(a, θ, t, α, β) and public policy (θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗) such
that the following conditions (i)− (iv) are satisfied:
(i) Contributions are non-negative but less than the contributor’s income.
(ii) The policy (θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗) maximizes the government’s welfare (14) taking
the contribution schedules as given,
(θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗) ∈ argmax
(θ,t,α,β)∈Γ
{
G
(
θ, t, α, β,Rw(a, θ, t, α, β), Rf (a, θ, t, α, β)
)}
;
(17)
(iii) The worker (MNC) cannot have a feasible strategy Rw(a, θ, t, α, β)(
Rf (a, θ, t, α, β)
)
that yields him (it) a higher level of utility than in equilib-
rium, given the government’s anticipated decision rule,7(
θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗, Ri(a, θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗)
) ∈ argmax
(θ,t,α,β)∈Γ
Uw(Cw),(
θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗, Ri(a, θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗)
) ∈ argmax
(θ,t,α,β)∈Γ
Cf . (18)
(iv) The worker (MNC) provides the government at least with the level of
utility that it could get when the worker (MNC) offers nothing
Rw = 0 (Rf = 0), and the government responds optimally given the MNC’s
(worker’s) contribution function,
G(θ, t, α, β, Rw(a, θ, t, α, β), Rf (a, θ, t, α, β)
≥ sup
(θ˜,t˜,α˜,β˜)∈Γ
G(θ˜, t˜, α˜, β˜, Rw(a, θ˜, t˜, α˜, β˜), 0)),
G(θ, t, α, β, Rw(θ, t, α, β), Rf (a, θ, t, α, β))
≥ sup
(θ˜,t˜,α˜,β˜)∈Γ
G(θ˜, t˜, α˜, β˜, 0, Rf (a, θ˜, t˜, α˜, β˜)). (19)
7Here, the utility of the worker (MNC) is independent of his/her contribution schedule.
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5 Taxation and labour market regulation
Given differentiable functions (12) and (13), conditions (18) take the form(
θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗, Rw(a, θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗)
)
∈ argmax
(θ,t,α,β)∈Γ
Uw
(
Cw(θ, t, α, β,Rw(a, θ, t, α, β))
)
,
= argmax
(θ,t,α,β)∈Γ
Cw(θ, t, α, β,Rw(a, θ, t, α, β)),(
θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗, Rf (a, θ∗, t∗, α∗, β∗)
)
∈ argmax
(θ,t,α,β)∈Γ
Cf (θ, t, α, β,Rf (a, θ, t, α, β)) (20)
and
∂Cw
∂i
=
∂Rw
∂i
and
∂Cf
∂i
=
∂Rf
∂i
for i = θ, t, α, β, (21)
which suggests that in equilibrium the change in the worker’s (MNC’s) con-
tribution due to a change in the instrument is equal to the change in labour
income (net profit) due to this same fact. Thus, the contribution schedules
are locally truthful. As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), or in Grossman
and Helpman (1994), this concept can be extended to a globally truthful con-
tribution schedule. This type of schedule represents the preferences of the
worker (capitalist) at all policy points. From (12), (19) and (21) it follows
that the truthful contribution functions take the form
Rw = max[0, v − v0], Rf = max[0, pi − ν], (22)
where v0 (pi0) is the worker’s (the owner of the MNC) income when he does
not pay contributions but the government chooses its best response given the
MNC’s (worker’s) contribution schedule. Evidently, v0 = 0 and pi0 = ν.
Assume that the nature has chosen the labour market as competitive
or fully deregulated, α = β = 0. Because then ∂pi/∂t < 0 by (9), the
government can press profit pi down to pi0 = ν by increasing t. This implies
Rf = max[0, pi − ν] = pi − ν, Cf = ν and the following result:
Proposition 1 With a competitive labour market, the government presses
the MNC’s net profit to the minimum Cf = ν through labour taxation t.
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This result is in distinct contrast with the conventional wisdom that MNCs
should prefer a fully deregulated (or non-unionized) labour market.
Assume that the nature has chosen bargaining over wages and employment.
The government can then freely choose relative union power β ∈ [0, 1] in the
bargain over employment. If the MNC does not pay contributions, Rf = 0,
then, given (9), the government sets β high enough to press profit pi down to
pi0 = ν. This implies R
f = pi − ν, Cf = ν and the following result:
Proposition 2 With a bargain over the wage and employment, the govern-
ment uses labour market regulation (i.e. the parameter β) as a non-distorting
income transfer between the worker and the MNC. With this transfer, it
presses the MNC’s net profit to the minimum Cf = ν.
Finally, assume that the nature has chosen bargaining over wages only, β = 0.
Propositions 1 and 2 then yield the following corollary:
Proposition 3 Right-to-manage bargaining with α > 0 and β = 0 protects
FDI best against expropriation and allows the MNC’s net profit to exceed the
minimum level ν.
6 The political equilibrium
According to (18), the government’s objective function (14) must be maxi-
mized by θ, t, α and β subject to the set (16). Given (13) and (15), this is
equivalent to maximizing the function
L = Rw(a, θ, t, α, β) +Rf (a, θ, t, α, β) + Uw(Cw∗ ) + U g
(
g(a, θ, t, α, β)
)
(23)
by (θ, t, α, β), where, by (20) and the envelope theorem, Cw∗ can be taken
to be independent of (θ, t, α, β). The worker’s and MNC’s total revenue
C
.
= Cw + Cf is equal to output y minus capital cost ck minus the worker’s
opportunity wages bl minus the government’s tax revenue g. Given (9) and
(10), we then obtain
C(a, θ, t, α, β)
.
= Cw + Cf = y(l, k)− bl − ck − g. (24)
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Noting (21), (23) and (24), we obtain the first-order conditions for taxes:
∂L
∂i
=
∂Rw
∂i
+
∂Rf
∂i
+ (U g)′
∂g
∂i
=
∂Cw
∂i
+
∂Cf
∂i
+ (U g)′
∂g
∂i
=
∂C
∂i
+ (U g)′
∂g
∂i
= 0 for i = θ, t. (25)
These conditions yield the following rule:
Proposition 4 (Ramsey rule) A government sets taxes t and θ to mini-
mize the deadweight loss of public finance so that the decrease in total con-
sumption C is in the same proportion to the increase in tax revenue g for the
marginal increases of all of them, ∂C
∂θ
/
∂g
∂θ
= ∂C
∂t
/
∂g
∂t
.
There are two sources of the deadweight loss of public finance: a lower profit
leads to lower investment and there is an opportunity wage b. These sources
make the tax revenue elastic with respect to the labour and investment taxes.
With right-to-manage bargaining α > 0 and β = 0, noting (23) and (24),
we obtain the first-order conditions for union power α as follows:
∂L
∂α
=
∂Rw
∂α
+
∂Rf
∂α
+ (U g)′
∂g
∂α
=
∂C
∂α
+ (U g)′
∂g
∂α
= 0 for α > 0 and β = 0.
(26)
In the model, the partial derivative of C with respect to α is unfortunately
ambiguous. We make however the plausible assumption that the increase in
union power in wage bargaining (i.e. a higher α) reduces total consumption,
∂C/∂α < 0, but increases the worker’s consumption, ∂Cw/∂α > 0. This
and the definition (24) imply ∂Cf/∂α < 0. If ∂g/∂α ≤ 0, then from (26)
it follows that ∂L/∂α < 0. In the remaining case ∂g/∂α > 0, there is
∂C/∂α + (U g)′∂g/∂α = 0. We summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 5 (Extended Ramsey rule) Assume that there is bargain-
ing only over wages, β = 0. As long as deregulation (i.e. a decrease in
α) does not reduce tax revenue g, ∂g/∂α ≤ 0, it is optimal for the govern-
ment to weaken union power α. Otherwise, there exist a political equilibrium
in which the government maintains union power by regulation to minimize
the deadweight loss of public finance. The government then increases union
power α until the decrease in total consumption C is in the same proportion
to the increase in tax revenue g for union power and taxes taken together,
∂C
∂α
/
∂g
∂α
= ∂C
∂β
/
∂g
∂β
= ∂C
∂t
/
∂g
∂t
= ∂C
∂θ
/
∂g
∂θ
.
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This proposition can be explained as follows. Because labour market
deregulation (the decrease in α) decreases union power and wages but in-
creases the MNC’s and worker’s total revenue C, it is in the government’s
best interest to implement deregulation as long as this does not decrease tax
revenue, ∂g/∂α ≤ 0. If regulation (i.e., the increase in α) increases tax rev-
enue g, then the government uses regulation in combination with taxes t and
θ as a means of evening out the deadweight loss of public finance. Then, in
equilibrium, the decrease in total revenue C must be in the same proportion
to the decrease in tax revenue g for a marginal increase of any of the three
policy instruments θ, t and α.
7 The implicit agreement
At the second stage of the extended game, the MNC and the government
make an implicit contract on the minimum level of the MNC’s income, ν.
For such a contract to form a subgame perfect equilibrium, it must satisfy
the following two conditions:
(i) The government must be better off letting the MNC to earn Cf = ν and
to choose action a = a rather than expropriating the entire profit (i.e.
Cf = 0) and letting the MNC to choose action a = a.
(ii) The MNC must be better off choosing a = a and accepting net profit
Cf = ν rather than choosing a = a and accepting expropriation Cf = 0.
Noting (12) and (23), we define the government’s maximum welfare W
after the exercise of public policy as follows:
W(a, ν) .= max
θ,t,α,β
L, ∂W/∂a > 0, W(a, ν) <W(a, 0). (27)
Because higher total factor productivity a increases all income in the same
proportion, it must raise the government’s welfare, ∂W/∂a > 0. Because
expropriation (ν = 0) means higher revenue for the government, its elimina-
tion decreases the government’s welfare when total factor productivity a is
kept constant, W(a, ν) <W(a, 0). Given (27), the government can credibly
commit itself to the minimum profit ν which satisfies W(a, ν) = W(a, 0).
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Hence, if a is close enough to zero, there exists ν > 0. With ν > 0, condi-
tions (i) and (ii) both hold and there exists an implicit contract between the
government and the MNC over the minimum level of the MNC’s profit.
8 Conclusions
This paper compares MNC’s investment risk in the presence of (a) the com-
petitive or fully deregulated labour market, (b) “efficient” bargaining over
both wages and employment, and (c) “right-to-manage” bargaining over
wages only. The main characteristics of the model are the following. The
government sets taxes to finance public services and regulates the labour
market, and lobbies representing the workers and the MNC influence govern-
ment policy. If the government protects union power, then the MNC bargains
over wages and employment with a labour union representing its workers.
When there are sunk costs associated with FDI, but the MNC can at
the occurrence of expropriation punish the host country by leaving its assets
unproductive, the government and the MNC can implicitly agree on some
minimum profit of FDI. In order to maintain efficiency, it is not in the gov-
ernment’s interest to decreases profits below this minimum. It depends on
the specification of labour market institutions (e.g. (a)− (c) above) whether
the MNC is able to raise its profit above this minimum.
Conventional wisdom has said thus far that labour market deregulation
improves the competitiveness of the economy as regards attracting FDI. In
contrast, this document suggests that deregulation presents a potential risk
for FDI. When wages are competitively determined, the government can use
taxation as a non-distorting instrument to press the profit from FDI to the
minimum level specified by the implicit contract. On the other hand, when
wages are determined by by “right-to-manage” bargaining, employment is
elastic with respect to the tax rates and taxation involves a social cost. In
such a case, the MNC is able to raise its profit from FDI above the minimum.
When there is bargaining over both wages and employment, the govern-
ment can use taxation and labour market regulation together to produce a
non-distorting income transfer between the MNC and workers. It can also
use this transfer to press the MNC’s profit from FDI to the minimum level.
14
Hence, only right-to-manage bargaining as an institution truly protects FDI
from excessive expropriation and predicts higher profits for foreign investors.
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